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This research evaluated market power-cost efficiency trade-offs in the U.S. wheat milling
industry.  The principal findings are that the hypothesis of competition could not be rejected, and
increasing concentration has helped to reduce the marketing margin by $0.65/100lbs flour.  Social
concerns about market power in this industry probably are unwarranted. 
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Introduction: The U.S. wheat milling industry has undergone significant structural
change in the past 30 years.  Average mill size has grown by over 40%, location advantages are
relatively more favorable for plants located nearer consumer markets, and the four-firm
concentration ratio has more than doubled from 30% in 1969 to 77% in 1995 (Wilson).
Concentration levels of this magnitude typically raise concern about the degradation of
competition in an industry and the resulting welfare implications on upstream suppliers and
downstream consumers.   However, the role of increasing concentration in reshaping the nature of
competition is far more complex than suggested by the structure-performance link to increased
market power.  Increased concentration also is linked to economies of scale and technical
efficiency improvements, which can drive the price of outputs down and the price of principal
inputs up and increase output.  
This fundamental trade-off between market power and efficiency is at the heart of more
recent interpretations of antitrust laws and stems from the points in Williamson’s (1968A) classic
article over three decades ago.  Mueller made this point most forcefully: “As the 1960's wore on,
and the Supreme Court endorsed ever bolder attempts by the government to extend the reach of
antitrust laws, dissent by economists began to grow.  Responding to Justice Douglas’ dismissal in
Procter and Gamble . . . . , Oliver Williamson (1968[A]) advocated a welfare trade-off approach
to mergers.  Instead of focusing exclusively on their anticompetitive effects, courts were to weigh
the anticompetitive effects of mergers against their efficiency gains.”
The philosophical shift from simple consumer welfare to a more comprehensive antitrust
policy to include efficiency arguments generated important pro-business U.S. antitrust rulings inFor example, of the 33 studies summarized in Azzam and Anderson that investigated
1
market power in the U.S. meat processing industries, only three addressed the efficiency issue
(Ward, Hall et al., Schroeter and Azzam), and only Schroeter and Azzam did so as a principally
stated objective.  Furthermore, both Schroeter and Azzam and Hall et al. suggested that 
increased concentration led to net efficiency benefits, and Ward’s study was inconclusive.
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the 1970s (Mueller). By 1984, the Department of Justice formally changed its Merger Guidelines
to specifically limit the scope of merger challenges in cases when cost efficiency gains outweigh
noncompetitive effects (Mueller). These changes and the rise of conservative politics in the 1980's
paved the way for major structural changes in U.S. businesses.  Most noteworthy was increased
merger activity, vertical arrangements, and rapidly increasing industrial concentration (Lande).
Peltzman found considerable evidence supporting Williamson’s proposition. 
Dixon demonstrated how aggregated cost functions generate testable hypotheses about cost
efficiencies.  Like Peltzman, he found considerable support across a group of U.S. industries that
cost efficiencies accrue from increasing concentration.   Azzam (1997) used Dixon’s aggregation
technique to test the cost-efficiency trade-off question on the U.S. beef packing industry.   He
found that the benefits from cost efficiencies outweighed the impact of market power. 
Given the results supporting Williamson and subsequent changes in antitrust law, it is
indeed perplexing that the economics field has not addressed the issue of market power more in
this way.     The market power-efficiency debate is also important in light of increased global
1
competition, freer trade, and negotiations to harmonize competition policies across nations and
free trade regions (Immenga, Jenny, and Petersmann).  As Mueller pointed out, the United States
has maintained the most stringent antitrust laws in the world. Yet theory and empirical evidence
point to strategic trade advantages to nations that allow complex vertical structures, nationally










Stiegert and Hamilton). Clearly, understanding the impact of increasing concentration is more
than just measuring market power.    
This study had two objectives. The first was to evaluate the null hypothesis of a
competitive flour-wheat marketing margin for the U.S. wheat milling industry.  A statistical test of
market power was generated for each quarter from 1983-I through 1995-II for the wheat input
market and for the flour output market. By evaluating each quarter, these tests helped to reveal
when or if noncompetitive  pricing occurred in the wheat input and/or flour output markets.
A second objective was to evaluate the role of increased concentration as a potential source of
lower marginal costs for the industry.  Once again, a statistical test is generated at each data point
to allow the model to reveal when or if such benefits arose.  
Conceptual Framework:  Consider an industry with firms that have the potential to buy a
principal material input with oligopsonistic power and to sell a processed good with oligopoly
power. The supplier of the principal input and the buyers of the  output good are assumed to be
perfectly competitive.  This  particular structure fits nicely into the institutional framework of
wheat milling, which relies on a simple technology to process a principal input into a principal
output and a byproduct (Azzam, 1992).  We proceed with a terse presentation of the model.  A
complete version is available on request.    
A  wheat production/storage (hereafter upstream) sector is assumed to be competitive,
with each upstream firm facing a cost function that aggregates to an industry-wide cost function. 






























where p is the price of wheat, q  = eq  is wheat flour obtained from the product of total wheat w f w 
processed at the extraction rate e.  C  is the cost function, and z  is a vector of producer input
w
w
prices.  The above conversion to flour using wheat extraction implies a  a fixed proportion
between wheat and flour but leaves flexible the remaining cost relationships.   Taking the first
order condition of the profit equation representing the baking sector and rearranging yields: 
where k  is a constant to convert bread output to a flour equivalent basis, p  is the price of bread, 1 b
q  is the quantity of bread produced, p  is the price of flour, C  is the processing cost function, and  bf
b
z  is a vector of baking input prices.   b
The milling profit equation for firm i is given by:
where p  is the selling price of byproducts (e.g. middlings), C  is the milling processing cost m
fi
function considered to be a function of wheat processed, wheat prices, and a vector of other
processing input prices.  The first term in (3) is the percentage of wheat sold in the byproduct
market.  Substituting (1) and (2)  into (3) incorporates the profit maximizing first order conditions
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Taking the first derivative of (4), substituting back in the price of flour from (7) and the price of
wheat from (2), and aggregating the share-weighted sum of all firms in the industry yields:
The left side of equation (10) is composed of two revenue terms in the brackets minus the flour
equivalent price of wheat.  This expression for the marketing margin fits precisely the data
reported by the USDA in Wheat Situation and Outlook Report.  The right side of (4) indicates
that the  margin is made up of three different components that represent, from left to right, a
downstream market power term, an upstream market power term, and marginal processing costs.  
The market power terms each contain an aggregate conjectural elasticity [
where  ].  For this study, identifying 0 was not an issue.  We were only
concerned if marginal costs adequately explain movement in the marketing margin.
Methodology and Data:  Following equation (5) and specifying the processing, upstream
and downstream industry cost structures using generalized Leontiff cost functions, a model useful







As described in reference to (5), the first two terms on the right side of (6) are components of the
margin attributable to market power in the pricing of the material input and the material output.
Our theory essentially restricts these market power terms to be nonnegative.  The final term in (6),
[g(·)], is a general expression to capture shifts in marginal costs due to structural changes and
allows for inclusion of an intercept term.  The specific function for g(·) is given by:
where the /s are parameters to be estimated, CR4 is the four firm concentration ratio, and CU is
capacity utilization.  Imposing symmetry of the processing cost function of the miller requires that
￿ =￿ .  This study used two upstream prices, two downstream prices, and two prices in the ij ji
milling cost function.  The complete empirical specification of equation (6) is given by:
where US1 and US2 are two upstream market power terms derived from the second derivative of
the upstream cost function.  US1 contains a real farm input cost index, and US2 contains a real
farm labor price index. DS1 and DS2 are two downstream market power terms.  DS1 contains a
deflated formula index of baker inputs, which is based on a common  high production bread
formula from Pyler.  The second downstream term, DS2, contains a wage price series for average
hourly production worker earnings for bread, cakes and related products.
Two mill processing input prices were used.  One is an energy price index (MENGY)
industrial power 500 kw demand, and the other (MWAGE) is average hourly production workerPage 7
earnings for flour and grain mill products.  Both upstream and downstream market power terms
are restricted to be nonnegative by use of the exponential transformation of the appropriate pairs
of terms.  The term MM1 is the square root term as dictated by the third term on the right side of
(6).  The terms MILL1 and MILL2 each contain (2q /e) and one of the input prices as dictated by f
fourth term on the right side of (6).  The last row in (8) contains the efficiency terms from (6). 
Finally, the terms (u1, u2, d1,d2, a0, a1, ...., a5, b1,b2,b3) are parameters to be estimated.  
Equation (8), corrected for autocorrelation, was estimated using quarterly data from 1983-I to
1995-II.  Solutions were validated across a group of different starting values.   
Results and interpretation: Results from the first model are presented in Table 1. To
avoid the ambiguity associated with concentration and capacity utilization, the first model was run
without the efficiency terms.  Five of the six parameters of the milling cost function (a0, a1, a2,
a4, a5) and one of the upstream market power terms were statistically significant.  Significance of
the singular  portions of upstream or downstream market power is of little importance.  What is of
interest is the statistical significance and applied importance of total upstream and/or downstream
market power terms.  A test of the total upstream market power at the mean of the data is
presented at the bottom of Table 1.  Then a test for market power was conducted at each data
point using the parameter variances and covariances (Table 2).  The mean estimates for both
upstream and downstream market power were not significant.   Only 5 of the 50 upstream data
points in the study were statistically significant whereas  none of the downstream market power
terms were significant. Furthermore, the significant upstream market power data points were early0MARGIN
0CR4
￿ b1 ￿ b3￿CU ￿ 0.
0MARGIN
0CU
￿ b2 ￿ b3￿CR4 ￿ 0.
This is a strong result in light of Jones and Purcell’s study that evaluated the impact of
2
aggregation in identifying market power.  Using data generated from various simulated firm level
production technologies, they showed that standard NEIO specifications for aggregate cost
functions tend to identify market power when an industry is purposely structured to be
competitive and nearly competitive.  The results tend to suggest  that NEIO studies using
aggregated data increase the possibility of a Type I error above that suggested that by standard
inference of parameters.  In cases where market power was simulated, aggregation did not
hamper its identification.  The main point here is that if market power had been present in the
wheat milling industry, we probably could have identified it using aggregate data.
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in the study: three quarters in 1983 and one quarter in 1985 when concentration was the least
problematic.
2
The first model provides little or no evidence of market power, and the role of
increased concentration in fundamentally restructuring the competitive conditions of  the industry
must also  be very limited.   If increased concentration is having an impact on the industry, it must
be limited to technology and scale efficiencies.  The resulting  a priori hypothesis for model two is
that    Capacity utilization varies because of shifts in demand and in
supply of aggregate capacity.  If market power is not present, firms move along their marginal
processing cost curve in response to demand shifts, which immediately implies for model two
that:    
The results from model two are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  The parameters u1, u2, d1,
d2, and a0 through a6 are very similar in magnitude and sign, but fewer are now statistically
significant.  Similar to model one,  the tests of market power at the means failed to reject the null
hypothesis of competition.  Furthermore, market power tests were not significant in the upstream
and downstream markets at each data point.
Although none of the efficiency parameters were statistically significant as shown in Table
1, the marginal effect of concentration and capacity utilization is dependent on the direct effectPage 9
and on the interaction term. The standard errors for these marginal effects are calculated at each
data point.  The marginal effect on the marketing margin for concentration is negative and
statistically significant at the mean.  Furthermore, concentration is statistically significant for 34 of
the 50 data points.  The mean value of the marginal effect of concentration at -2.2 implies that for
every 1% increase in concentration the margin has tightened by about $.022.  Concentration has
risen through the study period from about 50% in 1983 to about 77% in 1995.  As a result,
concentration appears to be responsible for about a 65¢ reduction in the marketing margin.
The marginal effects of capacity utilization on the marketing margin were positive at each
data point but none were statistically significant.  Results showed no indication that firms use
excess capacity to limit price or that economic losses can be avoided when the industry operates
below design capacity.  In summary, the results associated with excess capacity were not
inconsistent with the industry operating in a competitive environment.   
Summary and conclusions: Wheat milling has become quite concentrated, with over
75% of milling capacity owned by the four largest firms.  The purposes of this study were to test
for tacit market power in the wheat buying and flour selling activities of the U.S. wheat milling
industry and to evaluate the role of increasing concentration on efficiency improvements in the
industry. The model used data from the first quarter of 1985 through the second quarter of 1995.  
The overwhelming result from this study was that the hypothesis of a competitive U.S.
wheat milling industry cannot be rejected. Specifically, hypothesis tests for market power in the
upstream sector indicated that only 5 of the 50 quarters were statistically different from zero.  A
similar test of market power in the downstream sector yielded no statistically significant
observations.  Furthermore, the marginal effect of concentration proved statistically significantPage 10
and negative, which suggested that increasing concentration has more to do with increasing
efficiency than in generating market power.  The results indicate that increased concentration has
led to about a $0.65 reduction in the marketing margin over time. 
Why would an industry with almost 80% of capacity controlled by four large firms not be
able to force a noncompetitive equilibrium?  Several institutional factors present in this industry
may in part offer an explanation.  First, wheat mills compete for wheat inputs and flour outputs on
a national scale (Stiegert, Parcell, and Blanc), which is structurally quite different than  industries
that process perishable goods or live animals.  Second, existence of a world market for wheat
generates considerable competition from grain traders, which may provides a sufficient deterrent
to firms trying to exercise market power.  A third, and perhaps most obvious, reason is that firms
have simply focused on efficiency and innovation during the period of the study. For whatever the
reason, market power does not appear to be a major concern for this industry at this time.
The key consequence of increasing concentration in milling was shown to be in the form
of efficiency gains.  Firms in this industry apparently have been driving each other toward a more
optimal firm size rather than using their size to extract monopsony or monopoly rents.  This result
strongly indicates the need for more intense evaluation, across the entire food sector, of the role
of increasing concentration in generating cost efficiencies.  Failure to do so puts our research
agenda out of step with antitrust proceedings and limits the critical role that economists have in
driving antitrust cases to their socially best outcomes.Page 11
Table 1: Model Results U.S. Wheat Milling Industry:1983I-1995II.
Variable First Model Second Model 
Upstream 
u1  0.0621 (0.045)* -2.439 (0.613)*
u2 -0.1505 (0.135) -1.292. (0.927)*
Downstream
d1  -0.0550 (0.062) -0.637 (0.059)
d2  0.1418  (0.161) 0.164  (0.153)
Mill Processing
a0        2.697 (1.850)  2.425 (1.35)
†‡  
a1 MENGY  1.609 (0.792)  1.622  (1.406)
‡
a2 MWAGE  0.178  (0.145)  0.225  (0.184)
a3 MM1  -0.575 (0.308)  -0.595 (0.497)
‡‡  
a4 MILL1 -0.1907 (0.113) -0.145 (0.165)
‡    
a5 MILL2  0.3926  (.250)  0.229  (0.155)
†  †   
Shift Variables 
b1 CR4  0.014 (0.098)
b2 CU  -1.828 (15.16)
b3 CR4×CU -0.004 (0.157) 
Other
Autocorrelation (’)   0.5725 (0.121) .573 (.153)
‡‡
R   0.7992   0.7950
2
Tests at the mean
Upstream Market Power  0.648 (0.662)  0.000 (0.000)
Downstream Market Power  0.255 (0.425)  0.196 (0.286)
Concentration -2.224 (1.550)*
Capacity Utilization  0.011 (0.013)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
*Significant a the 10% level for a one-tailed t-test   
Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test
‡
Significant at the 15% level for a two-tailed t-test
†Page 12
Table 2: Results of Market Power and Efficiency Tests at Each Data Point
Model 1: Upstream Statistically significant in all quarters of 1983 and first quarter of
Market Power 1985.  One-tailed test, ￿=.10
Model 1: Downstream Statistically significant in the first two quarters of 1995.  One-tailed
Market Power test, ￿=.10
Model 2: Upstream Not significant in any quarter.
Market Power
Model 2:Downstream Not significant in any quarter. 
Market Power
Model 2: Concentration Negative in all quarters.  Statistically significant in 34 of the 50
[0MM/0CR4]
quarters.  One-tailed test, ￿=.10  
Model 2 Capacity Positive, but not significant in all quarters. 
Utilization [0MM/0CU]Page 13
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